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ABSTRACT
The tremendous popularity gained by Online Social Networks (OSNs)
raises natural concerns about user privacy in social media platforms.
Though users in OSNs can tune their privacy by deliberately de-
ciding what to share, the interaction with other individuals within
the social network can expose, and eventually disclose, sensitive
information. Among all the sharable personal data, geo-location is
particularly interesting. On one hand, users tend to consider their
current location as a very sensitive information, avoiding to share it
most of the time. On the other hand, service providers are interested
to extract and utilize geo-tagged data to offer tailored services. In
this work, we consider the problem of inferring the current location
of a user utilizing only the available information of other social con-
tacts in the OSN. For this purpose, we employ a graph-based deep
learning architecture to learn a model between the users’ known and
unknown geo-location during a considered period of time. As a study
case, we consider Twitter, where the user generated content (i.e.,
tweet) can embed user’s current location. Our experiments validate
our approach and further confirm the concern related to data privacy
in OSNs. Results show the presence of a critical-mass phenomenon,
i.e., if at least 10% of the users provide their tweets with geo-tags,
then the privacy of all the remaining users is seriously put at risk.
In fact, our approach is able to localize almost 50% of the tweets
with an accuracy below 1km relying only on a small percentage of
available information.
ACM Reference Format:
Luca Luceri, Davide Andreoletti, and Silvia Giordano. 2019. Infringement
of Tweets Geo-Location Privacy: an approach based on Graph Convolu-
tional Neural Networks. In Proceedings of ACM Conference (Conference’17).
ACM, New York, NY, USA, 6 pages. https://doi.org/10.1145/1122445.xxxxx
1 INTRODUCTION
During the past decade, Online Social Networks (OSNs) have gained
tremendous popularity worldwide. For example, as of January 2018,
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Twitter and Facebook count around 3301 and 21702 millions active
users, respectively. OSNs provide platforms where users can come
in contact with each other and share private information about them-
selves (e.g., interests, age, location, just to name a few). This fact
raises natural concerns about privacy issues in OSNs, that users can
tune by deliberately deciding what to share. Due to the inherently
network-oriented nature of OSNs, however, users interact among
each other in several ways, and the information about each user is
not completely on its hand. For instance, a generic user can be men-
tioned in relation to a specific topic by another user, thus revealing a
potential interest for a given subject. The market value of an OSN
highly depends on the amount and quality of data that users share
about themselves, as this allows the OSN owner to offer services
that are increasingly-tailored toward the particular characteristics of
each user. Hence, the OSN operator might be interested to develop
tools for extracting as much knowledge as possible from the data of
its users. An information that users tend to consider particularly sen-
sitive is their location, which OSNs generally allow to associate with
the contents that users publish (operation referred to as geo-tagging).
In this work, we consider the problem of inferring the location
associated with users’ generated messages published in Twitter (i.e.,
the geo-tags of the tweets). Specifically, we aim to infer the locations
of tweets without geo-tag from the geo-tagged ones. Notice that
we do not base our analysis on the content of the tweets (which is
often informative of their locations) but only on signals (i.e., the
geo-tags) from the social network users. The motivation behind this
choice is two fold. First, we aim to understand to what extent users’
personal information can be estimated from social cues. Second, we
consider the case when user’s personal tweets and information are
not available (because of privacy settings) and, thus, are not usable
inputs for the inference. Further, we consider the realistic scenario
where only a subset of users (not necessarily friends with each other)
geo-tag their tweets.
We employ a deep learning architecture to learn a model between
the geo-tagged and not-geo-tagged tweets that users generate during
a considered period of time. The location is expressed as a pair
of latitude and longitude and the inference problem is framed as
a regression. The employed deep learning architecture has been
proposed in [9] and it is trained on data structured as sequences
of labeled graphs. Specifically, each element of the sequence is a
graph representing a snapshot of the OSN in a given period of time,
i.e., each node of the network represents a user and its label is the
geo-location of the tweet published by the user in the considered
1https://www.omnicoreagency.com/twitter-statistics/
2https://wearesocial.com/uk/special-reports/digital-in-2017-global-overview
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period, whereas the edges represent friendship relation between
users. The architecture is composed of two main building blocks: a
convolutional layer, which learns to represent the relations among
the users and a Long-Short-Time-Memory layer, which learns a
model of the sequence of graphs. Our experiments confirm both the
validity of the proposed approach and the serious concern about data
privacy in OSN. In fact, one of the main take-aways of our work
is the presence of a critical-mass phenomenon, i.e., if at least 10%
of the users provide their tweets with geo-tags, then the privacy of
all the remaining users is seriously put at risk. The results obtained
by means of simulations show that with this small percentage of
available information our approach is able to localize almost 50% of
the tweets.
This paper is structured as follows. In Section 2 we provide
some related work about the topics of location inference in Twitter.
Section 3 is devoted to the problem statement. Section 4 describes
the proposed system. Results are presented and discussed in Section
5, while Section 6 concludes the paper.
2 RELATED WORK
As one of the most popular OSNs, Twitter has gained a world-wide
coverage of users who daily tweet on the social platform. Twitter
users have the possibility to declare their home addresses and include
real-time locations when sharing tweets. Knowing user location
opens the way to several applications. For this reason, location
inference on Twitter has received tremendous interest in the last
decade [11]. Considerable research has focused on this topic - trying
to bridge online and offline worlds using location information -
developing applications to detect emergency [1, 6], monitor public
health of citizens [2], recommend places and events [7, 10].
Location in Twitter can be divided in three categories [11], namely
home location, mentioned location, and tweet location. Home lo-
cations refer to Twitter user’s long-term residential address, which
can be self-declared (at different levels of granularity) in the user’s
profile. Users may also name given locations in the tweet content,
thus, these are referred to as mentioned locations. Finally, tweet
location corresponds to the place where a tweet has been generated,
which is the geo-tag embedded in the tweet. This information is
highly valuable for service providers as it allows to have a complete
picture of users’ mobility, interests, and preferences. However, only
less than 1% of tweets has explicit geo-tags [3]. For this reason,
tweet location inference remain an open and challenging problem.
As described in [11], tweet location inference can rely on multiple
sources of information: (i) tweet content, (ii) twitter social network
among users, and (iii) twitter contextual information, which incorpo-
rates the previous two sources along with meta-data related to both
tweets and users’ profiles.
In this work, we focus on the tweet location inference, because
on one hand users’ dynamic geo-location is a desirable information
for multiple applications, and on the other hand it represents an
open problem for users’ privacy in OSNs. In particular, we rely
only on the source of information provided by the twitter social
network. Similarly, in [8], tweet location inference is performed
utilizing only social network information. In particular, the authors
model the location sequence of each user with a Dynamic Bayesian
Network (DBN), whose features are friends’ locations, the time of
the day, and the day of the week. Compared to this approach, our
proposed method differs for two main reasons. While in [8] all the
information about users’ friends is exploited, we consider the more
realistic scenario where only a subset of users (not necessarily friends
with each other) provide their location. Moreover, their approach
is framed as a classification problem, where nearby locations are
merged together in a unique cluster (class), and thus, only known
clusters can be inferred. In a different way, we face this problem with
a regression model, which infers the pair of location coordinates and
can therefore generalize to unseen locations.
3 PROBLEM DEFINITION
Let G = (V ,E) be a directed graph representing Twitter social net-
work, where V = {u1,u2, . . . ,uN } is the set of users, and E is the
set of edges that link them. Connections among users in Twitter
are based on the followee/follower paradigm. A generic user ui can
follow another user uj without being necessarily followed back. For
this reason, we consider uj and ui to be friends iff (uj ,ui ) ∈ E and
(ui ,uj ) ∈ E.
We define T = {τ1,τ2, ...,τM } as the set of available tweets
posted on Twitter within a considered period of time. In Twitter, users
can provide information about their current location by explicitly
geo-tagging their tweet in the OSN platform. However, users do
not disclose their location in most of their tweets. Though hiding
this information may preserve user’s privacy, it has been shown that
location can be inferred combining multiple sources of information,
e.g., social network, tweet text, and mentions.
In this paper, we investigate how to discover the hidden location
information in users’ tweet exploiting only social cues. We propose
to infer user’s geo-location by leveraging on social contacts available
information in a given time slot. Time is discretized into slots of
duration ∆t in order to have as much information as possible from
several users in a limited amount of time. As an example, Figure
1 shows the locations of a user and her friends at different time
slots. User location is defined by the pair of coordinates (latitude,
longitude). Connections represent distances between the user and
her friends in the given time slot. We refer to this dynamic topology
as GEO-Social Network (GEO-SN). GEO-SN is a geo-spatial net-
work as the position of the nodes indicates a precise geo-location.
Moreover, GEO-SN is dynamic as (i) the locations and the distances
between the user and her friends vary with time and (ii) the number
of nodes changes according to the number of friends providing their
location within the time slot, as can be appreciated from Figure 1.
For the sake of simplicity, in Fig. 1, we show only the social net-
work of a single user, but our approach deals with the whole social
network topology.
Formalizing the problem, our objective is to determine ltmui , the
geo-location of userui at time slot tm , ∀i ∈ V and ∀m ∈ {1, 2, ...,M},
exploiting the location (if known) of other users in the OSN, i.e.,
{ltmuj , ltmuk , . . . , ltmun }. Overall, we aim to find a function f that models
user movements within the GEO-SN. This function should be able
to map each user’s location with others’ location by learning spatial
and temporal dependencies among them. Therefore, we define f (x)
as
f (x) = f ({ltmuj , ltmuk , . . . , ltmun }) = lˆtmui , (1)
where lˆtmui is the predicted location of ui at time slot tm .
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Figure 1: GEO-SN of a given user at different time slots.
4 METHODOLOGY
In this Section, we present the proposed methodology based on a
deep learning architecture, which is discussed in turn. Our purpose
is to model the spatial and temporal dependencies that users within
an OSN have on each other in relation to the information about
their tweets’ geo-tags. Specifically, our aim is to use this model
to infer the most probable location of a target user tweet based
only on other users’ available geo-tags. We consider the temporal
dependencies among tweets’ location and the social relations among
users as essential factors of this model, that we obtain by following
a deep-learning approach. The nodes of a graph are characterized by
i) a set of attributes, ii) a set of labels and iii) a relation among each
other.
While i) and ii) are common characteristics of data used with
machine learning, the question on how to learn a model also based
on the relations among the nodes of a graph has been receiving a
significant focus recently. A viable approach to consider the relations
among users may consist in processing the graph in such a way that
each node’s attributes are enriched with its neighbors attributes
(operation often referred to as embedding). This approach, however,
models only the relations among groups of friends within an OSN
and, thus, does not fit our scenario, where only a subset of users (not
necessarily friends with each other) provide their location. Therefore,
we are interested in modeling complex relations that go beyond
the friendship among users to learn spatio-temporal dependencies
among them.
An existing deep learning architecture that suites our needs has
been proposed in [9]. This architecture is referred to as GCNN-
LSTM and it is based on two main building blocks, namely a convo-
lutional layer and a recurrent layer. The former is aimed to extract
relevant social patterns, whereas the latter learns a temporal model
of the sequences of geo-tags. The deep learning architecture is ob-
tained by stacking the recurrent layer on top of the convolutional
one. The recurrent module implemented using the LSTM [4] cap-
tures long-term dependencies among the elements of the sequence
(i.e., the graphs at different time slots). However, this module may
fall short in modeling short-term relations within the sequence. To
capture both short and long-term relations we also make use of
a CNN-1D, which proved successful in modeling sequences (e.g.,
Figure 2: NYC Tweets in 2010
sentences [5]). The resulting architecture is composed of a CNN-
1D, a set of GCNN-LSTMs and a fully-connected layer stacked on
each other. The CNN-1D is characterized by a number of filters
NCNN of size wCNN . The GCNN-LSTM and the fully-connected
layers are characterized by their number of neurons, i.e., NG and
NF , respectively.
5 EXPERIMENTS
5.1 Data
To validate and evaluate our approach we make use of the Twitter
dataset collected in [8], which gathered tweets within 100 kilometers
of New York city center for 31 days. Figure 2 shows the spatial dis-
tribution of the tweets over all the collection period. Social network
connections have been collected, along with geo-tagged tweets, and
utilized to reveal friendship relations among users.
Table 1: Basic statistics of the Twitter dataset used in this study.
New York City Dataset
Unique users 6082
Friendship relationships 31874
Average Degree 10.22
Diameter 19
Clustering Coefficient 0.15
Density 0.001
Tweets 2173681
Locations 47808
In Table 1, we summarize the statistics about the data and network
properties related to the social graph. The average degree is the
average number of friends over all the users in the OSN, while the
diameter is the longest of the shortest paths in the social network.
The clustering coefficient is the average of the clustering coefficients
over all the users, where the latter is the ratio between the number of
links connecting user’s friends to each other to the possible number
of possible connections. Finally, the density is the ratio between the
number of edges connecting the users and the number of possible
edges in a network with N users.
5.2 Simulation Settings
Our objective is to evaluate the ability to violate users’ privacy at a
given time slot t given the information on the past NTS graphs. Each
graph represents a snapshot of the OSN in a given time slot of dura-
tion ∆t = 3 hours3. Specifically, the input of our deep learning archi-
tecture is the sequence of the graphs at time steps [t − NTS + 1, ..., t],
where at each time step we consider a different set of users who are
providing the location to their tweets. The output is the inference of
the location of those users who have not provided their location at
time t . We process the data in order to make them suitable to feed
the deep learning model. This processing results in input shaped as
3D tensors of dimensions (NTS ,N , F ), where NTS is the number
of time-steps (i.e., how far we look in the past of our sequence of
graphs), the total number of users N and F being the number of
features of each data point. For those users who do not publish a
tweet at a given time slot, we consider their last available geo-tags
as the features of the corresponding nodes in that time slot. Hence,
the number of features is set to F = 3 to account for i) latitude, ii)
longitude and iii) distance (in number of time slots) between the
considered time slot and the last time slot where the user has pro-
vided a valid geo-tag. On the other hand, the output are matrices of
dimension (N ,M), where M = 2 is the number of outputs (i.e., to
account for inferred latitude and longitude). We then normalize the
input and output tensors between 0 and 1.
Our primary objective is to assess the ability to violate users’
privacy as a function of the percentage of tweets that are geo-tagged.
To this aim, we introduce the parameter p as the probability that
a tweet is geo-tagged. We expect that low values of p will make
the inference less effective, since the deep learning architecture is
trained on less data and the learned model is then prone to over-fitting
issues. Conversely, high values of p will result in more information
3We set this parameter based on the average time between two consecutive tweets in
the dataset.
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Figure 3: Percentile of the geo-localization error (in Kms) com-
puted over the test with varying probability p that a tweet is
geo-tagged
Table 2: Mean values and percentage of tweets geo-localized
with an error < 1km, for different values of geo-tag probabil-
ity p
Mean Error
(in Kms)
% of tweets geo-localized
with an error < 1 km
p = 0.01 17.07 13.36%
p = 0.1 5.28 45.20%
p = 0.3 3.13 56.53%
p = 0.7 2.68 57.17%
p = 0.9 2.57 57.26%
available for the OSN provider and, consequently, will lead to an
increased ability to violate users’ privacy. We divide our data into
three non-overlapping sets, namely training, validation, and test sets.
Specifically, at each time slot we assign each node of the graph to
one of these sets. A node belongs to the training, validation and test
set with probabilities p, 0.5 · (1 − p) and 0.5 · (1 − p), respectively.
Notice that we perform the training, validation and test considering
only the users for which, at each time slot, the next location is known.
The others are simply discarded.
We employ a deep learning architecture formed by stacking to-
gether a CNN-1D with four filters (NCNN = 4) of size wCNN = 4,
three GCNN-LSTMs with NG={20, 10, 30} neurons, respectively,
and a fully-connected layer of NF = 2 neurons (which encode the
inferred latitude and longitude).
5.3 Results
In this Section we present an overview of the results that we have
obtained. We recall that we evaluate the proposed model on graph-
structured data, i.e., the sequence of the graphs representing the OSN
at each time slot. At each time slot, graphs’ nodes are characterized
by a unique attribute and a unique label. As explained in 5.2, the
(a) Highly-predictable tweets (b) Average-predictable tweets (c) Poorly-predictable tweets
Figure 4: Three main regions of the percentile of the geo-localization error (in Kms) with varying probability p that a tweet is geo-
tagged, computed on the test set
attributes represent the last available geo-tags of the considered users,
while the labels represent their geo-tags within the next time slot.
In Figure 3 we depict the percentile of the geo-location error. We
firstly notice that the percentage of geo-tagged tweets significantly
affects the ability of the model to correctly infer the geo-tags. In fact,
as expected, the accuracy (measured in terms of distance between
the inferred and the true location) is increasing with increasing p.
This phenomenon is made more evident in Table 2, where we show
the average error and the percentage of tweets that are localized with
an error below 1km with varying p. We notice, for example, that the
percentage of tweets localized with an error below 1km drops from
57% to 13% when p goes from 90% to 1%. The results summarized
in Table 2 suggest that p = 10% represents the threshold to allow an
effective localization. In fact, we notice a decrease of about 12km in
the localization error when p goes from 1% to 10%, while increasing
p from 10% to 30% decreases the error of around 2 kms only.
The curves depicted in Fig. 3 show similar behaviors. Specifi-
cally, the geo-location error slightly increases up to a certain value
of percentage of considered tweets (which depends on the geo-tag
probability p), about which it suddenly increases at a much higher
rate. It is therefore possible to divide the tweets into three main cate-
gories, namely highly-predictable, average-predictable and poorly-
predictable ones. The three categories are depicted in Fig. 4. The aim
of this figure is to underline that our model can accurately localize
the largest part of the tweets, which are consequently referred to as
highly predictable. Notice that even small values of p allow an effi-
cient geo-localization, i.e., under 1 km. This confirms the ability of
the employed deep learning architecture to efficiently learn common
patterns of users’ movements. The second category refers to tweets
that can be localized with an error that varies between 5 and 7 kms if
at least 10% of the total tweets are geo-tagged. Finally, the remaining
tweets are prone to large localization errors and can be regarded as
outliers, whose location cannot be inferred by our model.
To investigate and better understand the reasons behind these
results, we show in Figure 5 the average localization error (for
p = 0.9) for each user as a function of her mobility dynamics, here
represented by the standard deviation of the geo-tagged location
coordinates. Each point in the figure represents a user in the dataset.
Figure 5: Average localization error (for p = 0.9) for each user
as a function of her mobility dynamics, here represented by the
standard deviation of the geo-tagged location coordinates. Each
point in the figure represents a user in the dataset. Red points
represent user with an average localization error below 2.57km,
while blue points correspond to users with an error above this
value.
Users with small standard deviations in the latitude-longitude pair in-
dicates stationary users, whose mobility is restrained in a small area.
On the other side, high standard deviation values characterize mobile
users. Red points represent user with an average localization error
below 2.57km (according to Table 2), while blue points correspond
to users with an error above this value. As it can be appreciated from
Fig. 5, localization error does not vary with user mobility dynamics.
Though our model is able to infer the majority (73%) of the users
(included those highly mobile) with an accuracy below the average
localization error, it fails with some stationary users. Our hypothesis
is that these outliers have different mobility patterns compared to
the others and, thus, should be modeled separately. We will face
this issue in our next work, trying to separate the social network
in groups (or communities) according to mobility attributes and
locations similarity.
Finally, the overall probability that users provide their tweets with
a geo-location (i.e., p) is the most important driver of a successful
violation of users’ privacy. Specifically, the effectiveness of location
inference seems to be characterized by a critical mass, which is equal
to 10% of the total amount of available data in the considered dataset.
Notice that the single users do not have this information, as this
value results from the aggregation of the single users’ probability to
geo-tag their tweets. As a future work, we will consider the problem
of making the single users able to obtain p in a privacy-preserving
fashion (i.e., without asking each user to reveal its probability).
6 CONCLUSIONS
In this paper, we study the problem of location privacy in Twitter. In
particular, we consider the problem of inferring the current location
of a user utilizing only the available geo-tagged tweets from other
users in the OSN. We employed a graph-based deep learning archi-
tecture to learn a model between the users’ known and unknown
geo-location during a considered period of time.
Our experiments validate our approach and further confirms the
concern related to data privacy in OSNs. In fact, one of the main take-
away of our work is the presence of a critical-mass phenomenon,
i.e., if at least 10% of the users provide their tweets with geo-tags,
then the privacy of all the remaining users is seriously put at risk.
Results suggest that with a small percentage of available information
(10% of the geo-tagged tweets) our approach is able to localize
almost 50% of the tweets with an accuracy below 1km. Moreover,
we identified a class of highly predictable tweets, whose localization
estimate error is really small and does not vary consistently with the
percentage of available information in the OSN, further highlighting
the weakness of data privacy for some users in the social platform.
Finally, we plan to extend this model in order to improve the
inference also for outliers users. As a future work, we will consider
the problem of making users aware of their probability of privacy
leakage according to their (and other users) mobility patterns and
sharing activities.
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